-In most places around the world, multiple types of property rights regimes govern water. This chapter outlines various types of property rights and explores institutional design problems concerning commitment, agency, and decisionmaking costs. The implications of these problems for institutional relationships between communities and higher-level government are contrasted for water quantity allocation and water quality regulation. Successful reform must center on getting the relationships right among the actors exercising property rights in relation to water systems.
I n any given setting many different individuals, organizations, and governments will be exercising property rights in relation to water sources. For instance, most western U.S. states use several types of property rights systems to govern water, and that is even before taking into account the property rights of the federal government or of Native Americans. In most irrigation systems, farmers, farmer associations, the operator of the system, and perhaps provincial and national governments will be exercising various property rights in relation to the system and its water. All of these instances can be made more complex by including international boundaries and property rights in competing uses of water. Most societies use multiple types of property rights regimes to govern water depending on its type (ground, native surface, project, effluent), its location, and its use.
Given the complex institutional setting of water, the multiple types of property rights systems involved, and the multiple actors concurrently exercising rights in any given setting, better governance is a critical but difficult task. Various observers of current reform efforts urge consideration of different dimensions of institutional reform (Birdsall, Graham, and Sabot 1998; Ramaswamy and Cason 2003) . International lenders have begun to emphasize the necessity of comprehensively planning national poverty reduction programs as a precondition for financial assistance. Observers of urban water supply and sanitation system privatization have urged investment in the capacities of governments to regulate private utilities effectively. Nongovernmental organizations have urged attention be given to including communities and citizens in identifying, planning, developing, and operating local water systems. Each group has identified critical aspects of realizing good governance-strengthening the competence and including the active participation of different levels of government and of citizens.
One aspect of realizing good governance that has not received enough attention concerns the interactions and relationships among different levels of government, among different organizations functioning at different levels from the international to the local, and among individuals and organizations functioning at the same social level. Relationships among governments, organizations, and citizens are of central importance to scholars focusing on polycentric governing systems (Ostrom 1987; Oakerson 1999) . Polycentric systems are defined as "many overlapping arenas (or centers) of authority or responsibility. These arenas exist at all scales, from local community groups to national governments" (McGuiness 1999:2) .
Considerable discussion has been devoted to attempting to identify the appropriate level of government, or the appropriate public or private organization, to assign responsibility for carrying out specific tasks. Young (2002) argues that attention to such issues is somewhat misdirected. Although allocating appropriate tasks to different levels of government and to public and private organizations is certainly important, just as important is devising and supporting cooperative and mutually beneficial relations among diverse actors. Given that property rights consist of bundles of rights and that in every water setting property rights are unbundled with many individuals and organizations concurrently exercising shared rights, just as much if not more attention should be devoted to getting the relationships right among people and organizations (Young 2002) . Attending to the interactions among actors and limiting opportunities for opportunism, free riding, and exploitation is critical if effective and efficient water supply and sanitation systems are to be made available to all people .
Relationships among diverse actors in water settings are based on property rights. In the next section, property rights and their importance and complexity are delineated. The third section explores the challenges of devising water property rights that foster credible commitments; control the behavior of agents; and reduce decision costs, particularly in the context of vertical linkages between communities and national governments. The fourth section compares advantages of community governance for water allocation with advantages for government roles in regulation of water quality. The fifth section concludes the chapter by suggesting that reform, if it is to be successful, must center on getting the relationships right among the actors exercising property rights in relation to water systems.
Property Rights
According to J. R. Commons (1957) , property rights define relationships among people regarding things. Property rights define differing relationships among persons depending on the bundles of rights that people hold. Schlager and Ostrom (1992) define five types of distinct rights that may be bundled together in a variety of ways:
• access: the authority to enter a resource;
• withdrawal: the authority to remove units from a resource;
• management: the authority to make decisions about how the resource is to be used;
• exclusion: the authority to decide who may enter the resource; and
• transfer: the authority to sell, lease, or bequeath the resource.
The rights of access, withdrawal, management, exclusion, and transfer are roughly cumulative. The right of withdrawal implies a right of access. To make use of a resource one must be able to access it. The right of management implies rights of access and withdrawal. The holder of the right of management has the authority to define rights of withdrawal, that is, how the resource is to be used. A complete set of rights is commonly thought of as ownership. The holder of such a complete set of rights possesses the authority to define rights of access and rights of withdrawal as well as the authority to transfer portions of or all of the rights to someone else.
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Even in relation to a single type of water, multiple actors may exercise different bundles of rights in relation to it. For instance, many national governments are considering introducing market-based aspects to the provision and production of potable water in urban areas. Governments may select from a variety of contractual relationships (Johnstone and Wood 2001a:10-12) . Each type of contract represents a different bundle of property rights, a different means by which governments may divide and share their rights in water systems. A service contract, in which the government contracts for a specific activity, such as meter reading, involves a government sharing some management rights with a private company. The private company exercises limited (in terms of time and scope) management authority in relation to a water system. This contrasts sharply with a concession whereby the private company not only operates and maintains the system, but also invests in it. The government allows the private company to exercise the complete right of management, within certain constraints as specified in the concession. In addition, the private company exercises the right of exclusion. In its maintenance, investment, and expansion decisions, it decides who will have rights of access and withdrawal, again subject to conditions identified in the concession.
In a setting in which a government has signed a concession with a private consortium to operate, maintain, and expand an urban water system, government agencies, the consortium, and citizens who are customers of the utility all exercise property rights in relation to the water system. The government continues to exercise rights of transfer, exclusion, and management. However, through the concession it shares the rights of exclusion and management with the consortium. Through the concession, the government may have established a variety of performance targets. The private consortium attempts to realize those targets through the management and exclusion choices that it makes, such as how much to invest in maintenance versus expansion of the system. Citizens exercise rights of access and withdrawal. The choices and actions that each actor takes affect all other actors.
Problems of Commitment, Agency, and Decision Costs Commitment Problems
One issue almost certain to arise in institutional relationships for water governance is that of commitment. How committed is each of the actors to their agreements even in the face of temptations to violate them?
2 For instance, a government may be tempted, in the face of the consortium raising water rates, to renege on its commitment to allow it to realize sufficient revenues to cover the costs of investing in water delivery systems, including reasonable rates of return. A government may violate its commitment by forcing the consortium to lower its rates or by limiting the rate increases allowed. 3 Once a government reneges, however, the consortium faces few incentives to make long-lasting investments in the water system, thereby negating many benefits that could have been realized under a concession .
Commitment problems may also arise between the utility and its customers. Citizens may be tempted, in the face of increasing water rates, to evade their commitment to pay for their rights of access and withdrawal of potable water. Citizens may refuse to tie into the water system or they may tap into the system illegally. The effect of citizens reneging on paying for their rights of access and withdrawal are similar to the government reneging on its commitment to allow the utility to realize adequate revenues-the utility faces fewer or weaker incentives to invest in the development and maintenance of the water system. This problem has emerged in several cities that have signed concessions with private water consortiums, such as Buenos Aires (Mazzucchelli, Pardinas, and Tossi 2001) .
Vertical linkages, interactions among groups and organizations that extend across levels of social organization, present particularly difficult commitment problems (Young 2002) . National governments can take a larger perspective and attempt to balance the interests and activities of local and regional actors. But national governments can also pursue interests and goals that are at odds with local interests and goals. A national government may hold expanding foreign exchange earnings as a priority and allow industries to extract and pollute water at the expense of other local livelihoods. Or, as argue, some national regimes have been reluctant in reforming and investing in water systems in regions that provide very little electoral support to ruling parties. As Young (2002:267) concludes, national "regimes provide arenas in which the interests of powerful, nonresident players often dominate the interests of small-scale local users." Commitment problems can be especially problematic in vertical relations. National governments are often tempted to violate commitments made to local governments, whether those commitments involved allowing local governments considerable decisionmaking authority, or providing financial support for local undertakings, or national officials overturning the commitments their local representatives have made to local citizens and officials.
From the perspective of local governments, commitment problems in relation to national regimes are especially thorny. Relationships between national and local governments tend to be more asymmetrical, leaving local governments particularly vulnerable to the actions of national governments. For local governments the issue centers on gaining and maintaining the commitment of national governments to relationships that support their ability and capacity to govern well. This may be even more of a problem for water users' associations that do not have government standing.
Commitment problems can be anticipated and, thus, the actors can take steps to attempt to reduce their likelihood. note a variety of ways of "tying the hands" of government to make reneging on a commitment to utilities to recoup their costs much more difficult and costly. For instance, a government agency can be created to oversee and regulate private utilities, which is insulated from short-term political pressures. This may be accomplished by appointing executives to terms that extend across several election cycles, and making removal procedures of executives and managers difficult and time consuming. By insulating the regulatory agency from short-term political pressure, elected officials and their constituents may not as easily manipulate the concession for their own ends. Another solution is for governments to commit financial resources to large projects that would be lost if assets are expropriated (Noll, Shirley, and Cowan 2000:251) .
In addition, steps may be taken to ensure that water users tie into the system once it is completed. For instance, the U.S. Bureau of Reclamation, which builds and operates large surface water projects in the western United States, requires water users to sign "take or pay" contracts. Water users commit to paying for their share of the operation and maintenance costs of the water system even if once the system is completed they choose not to tie into and take water from it.
A multitude of mechanisms may be used to discourage national governments from reneging on their commitments to local governments. For instance, constitutional provisions provide greater protection from reneging than does legislation, particularly if national officials cannot easily amend the constitution and if the constitution is interpreted and enforced by an independent judiciary. Commitments to capacity building may be supported through dedicated sources of funding, such as bonds, the authority to levy fees, and earmarking of taxes, that do not pass through an annual budgetary process, but rather require special legislative action to change. Tying the hands of national governments in ways that permit local governments and organizations the authority and capacity to exercise their rights is key to resolving vertical commitment problems.
Ideally, limiting the authority of national governments to impinge on and violate the rights of actors and organizations at lower levels of social organization allows societies to tap into the benefits and strengths of local-level governments. Local communities are, in general, better at identifying, addressing, and resolving local problems than are regional or national governments. Better time and place information and more immediate feedback promote the creation of rules and projects that better fit the circumstances. Furthermore, local participation in rule and project creation can translate into greater legitimacy and consequently higher levels of rule conformance. Limit the authority of local actors, organizations, and governments to exercise authority, or regularly violate such authority, and the benefits of local participation and governance dry up. Locals are much less likely to invest in self-governance if that investment is regularly squandered. Examples abound of national governments acting in ways that discourage local level governance, such as governments seizing control of what had historically been locally owned and governed resources (Alexander 1982; Lansing 1991; Lam 1998; Agrawal 1999) .
The institutional mechanisms discussed earlier make it less likely or more costly for the government or for water users to renege on their commitments. As argue, however, in making it much more difficult for the government to renege, utilities are granted increasing leeway to act, even to act in inappropriate ways. For instance, the private utility may capture the regulatory agency and the agency may seek to realize the interests of the utility and not necessarily the interests of water users. In other words, commitment problems are resolved at the expense of agency problems.
Agency Problems
Agency problems arise as property rights holders exercise the authority granted to them by their property rights in ways that undermine, perhaps even subvert, the authority of others to exercise their property rights. For instance, if a utility chooses to siphon off a significant portion of the revenues that it collects from water users and invest those revenues in activities other than the maintenance and operation of the water system, water users' abilities to exercise their rights of access and withdrawal are impaired. Withdrawal of water from the system becomes increasingly problematic as the system crumbles. 4 That said, local governments and communities can exercise their authority in ways that directly violate national interests and goals, and that can be as heavy handed as their national government counterparts. As Rose (2002: 251-252) argues, American courts have been suspicious of customary law and practices, refusing to allow longstanding practices to "create legal rights that would govern communities." Customary rights were viewed as antidemocratic and courts argued that communities should be governed by open, constitutional practices, and that legislation should be openly discussed and determined.
Numerous case studies of successful local-level governance bear out these concerns. While communities have devised arrangements that support sustainable use of common-pool resources, the practices that they follow in relation to some community and noncommunity members can be alarming. Whether it is Maine lobster gangs destroying each other's equipment (Acheson 1975) , or the Berbers and Arabs using the Harantine as indentured labor in the building and maintenance of irrigation systems in numerous communities in the Ziz Valley of Morocco (Ilahiane 2001) , communities may exercise their authority in questionable ways. Agency problems are not limited to criminal behavior. Many agency problems involve more mundane issues. For instance, a constant source of tension between the U.S. federal government and state governments revolves around state implementation of federal environmental laws, such as the Clean Air Act and the Clean Water Act. The federal government prefers stricter implementation plans and more active monitoring and enforcement than states are often willing to provide (Landy, Roberts, and Thomas 1994) .
Agreements can address agency problems by specifying more completely the actions that agents must take or goals that agents must achieve in exercising their property rights. For instance, in a number of concessions that cities have signed with private water consortiums, specific performance-centered goals are written into the contracts. Common goals include extending coverage to specific areas and rehabilitating existing infrastructure within specified time limits, reducing unaccounted for water, and meeting specified water quality standards, assuming, of course, that the government has the ability and wherewithal to enforce such stipulations against multinational corporations.
More completely specifying the actions of shared property rights holders, or agents, comes with consequences. Decisionmaking costs increase as the shared property rights holders bargain and negotiate over the specific actions and goals that they must agree to meet. The more actions and goals considered, the higher the decisionmaking costs. At some point the decisionmaking costs overwhelm the benefits to be realized by more completely specifying actions. It is neither possible nor desirable to eliminate agents' discretion. The level of conflict among property rights holders directly affects decisionmaking costs. Higher levels of conflict tend to increase decisionmaking costs, thereby limiting the extent to which the actions of agents will be specified. In other words, agency problems are resolved at the expense of decisionmaking costs (Horn 1995) .
Decisionmaking Costs and Uncertainty
Decisionmaking costs and agency problems may be exacerbated by uncertainty. If the setting in which agents are to act is not well understood, or if the setting is characterized by legal, economic, or social uncertainty, devising a set of meaningful actions or goals may entail considerable decisionmaking costs, as information gathering and processing activities may need to be extensive and time consuming. For example, many urban poor live in areas far from existing infrastructure, on difficult terrain such as steep and rocky slopes, floodplains, and landfills, in semipermanent housing, with no urban planning and no legal title to their property. Devising workable water systems in such settings may be possible only with considerable field information and experience (Johnstone and Wood 2001b:46-47) .
Such decisionmaking costs may be avoided by adopting a set of actions and performance goals with little consideration given to the diverse and uncertain settings that agents are likely to confront; however, decisionmaking costs are then offset by confounding agency problems. Inevitably, even if agents work diligently to achieve agreed upon goals, they will be tripped up by novel circumstances. Again, decisionmaking costs may be reduced at the expense of agency problems and agency problems may be reduced at the expense of increased decisionmaking costs.
One approach suggested for addressing situations characterized by considerable uncertainty is to engage in more open-ended contracts in which actions and performance goals may be revised, either over the course of the bidding process or over the course of the contract, as circumstances change and as actors gain experience and greater knowledge of diverse settings (Johnstone, Hearne, and Wood 2001:40-41) . Open-ended contracts provide opportunities to address agency problems by revising actions and goals, but they also provide opportunities for reneging on commitments. For instance, renegotiating the terms of a concession to better fit it to its circumstances will provide opportunities for a government to renege on its commitment to allow the private utility to earn a reasonable return on its investment. argues that as settings become increasingly complex and uncertain, market-like relationships become increasingly untenable. If the advantages of a concession-investment in and careful management of a water system-are to be realized, for instance, the concession must be stable and secure so that the concessionaire may rely on it and plan accordingly. Incorporating multiple qualifications and conditions, that is, permitting a certain open-endedness, allows for flexibility in the face of uncertainty and surprise, but it reduces security. Conversely, devising fixed and relatively simple concessions enhances security, but limits the ability to respond to new and unexpected circumstances (Rose 2002:244-245) . The point at which complexity and uncertainty overwhelm the benefits of market-based arrangements varies depending on the circumstances. Community-based governance can be a viable alternative if market-based arrangements are inappropriate.
Commitment, agency, and decisionmaking costs are ubiquitous (see Box 2.1). They can arise in any setting in which more than one person is making choices (Miller 1992; Horn 1995) . Consequently, they are likely to arise in some form in virtually every water setting because of shared property rights among governments, organizations, and citizens. In choosing how to allocate and share property rights so that appropriate incentives are created that encourage the realization of desired goals, individuals must also pay attention to the trade-offs that must be made among transaction costs. For instance, a single-minded focus on efficiency may lead to unintended consequences if commitment and agency problems are neglected. Coordinating the exercise of property rights and attending to the trade-offs among commitment, agency, and decisionmaking costs will be further explored in the next section in relation to two different settings-water allocation and water quality. The means by which a community of roughly co-equal water users may coordinate their actions and address the trade-offs among commitment, agency, and decisionmaking in relation to water allocation and use are explored first. This is contrasted to a situation in which a government and not a community makes the rules that would allow water users to coordinate the exercise of their property rights.
Community-Based Governance of Water
During the past 15 years, considerable attention has been devoted to community or local-level governance of common-pool resources such as water, forests, fisheries, and rangelands. Common-pool resources are defined as natural or man-made resources for which exclusion is difficult and costly to achieve, and use is subtractable (Ostrom and Ostrom 1977) . In governing common-pool resources well, problems arising from both lack of exclusion and subtractability must be addressed. Limiting access to a common-pool resource does not ensure its sustainability if those who have access may harvest or otherwise use the resource in unsustainable ways. Conversely, carefully governing the use of a common-pool resource does not guarantee its sustainability if exclusion has not been adequately dealt with.
Considerable attention is being devoted to the study and promotion of community-based governance, in part because of the perceived failure and recognized limitations of state-centered and market-based approaches. State-centered governance of natural resources has produced disappointing results. Deforestation has, in some cases, accelerated. Rich and productive fisheries have disappeared. Stateowned water systems have been poorly managed and maintained. Although market-based approaches are recognized as having the potential to overcome some failures of a state-centered approach, there is increasing recognition that market-based approaches are not appropriate in all circumstances Tietenberg 2002) . For instance, lack of supporting institutional arrangements from governments and communities, thin markets, settings involving considerable externalities and spillovers, and transaction costs that exceed the benefits generated by market arrangements have all been noted.
Community-based governance, in many instances, performs better than government-centered approaches because locals possess superior time and place information about the resource and how their actions affect the resource. Local users, in designing rules of access and of use, can draw on this information as well as their understanding of the social setting to better match rules to circumstances. Also, locally designed rules are viewed as legitimate and are more likely to be followed than rules that are imposed by outsiders. Well-designed rules that are followed produce superior performance (Ostrom 1990; .
Many of these same themes are beginning to emerge in the literature assessing countries' experiences with concessions, leases, and contracts for urban water and sanitation systems. State-owned and -operated utilities have, in general, performed poorly for a variety of technical and political reasons. For instance, public managers of such systems face few incentives to provide effective service because their compensation and employment is not conditioned on performance. In many instances, limits on charging fees for services severely constrain the resources available to reinvest in the system. Political overseers often view public utilities as sources of patronage . Urban settings and urban populations are heterogeneous. Such heterogeneity challenges the ability of a centralized approach to effectively produce and deliver water and sanitation services. Statecentered approaches tend to deliver a homogeneous set of services not well suited for such diverse settings.
It is a mistake, however, to assume that citizens are not consuming water and sanitation services if they are not tied into a large-scale water system. Citizens make arrangements for alternative services, and often the provision of alternative services requires citizens to engage in collective action. Citizens actively engage in diverse forms of local governance with the purpose of providing water and sanitation services. Analysts are beginning to recognize and identify examples of workable community-based efforts, whether in relation to collecting bills or providing voluntary labor to build or tie into a system. This recognition of the viability and desirability of community-based efforts has in turn produced calls for actively involving communities and neighborhoods in water system reforms if cost-effective and appropriate water services are to be provided to all residents in a timely manner.
Analysts recognize that private sector participation in the provision and production of water services requires an active government presence and that considerable attention must be devoted to building the capacity of governments to engage in oversight roles. Part of that government capacity building must include attending to and supporting local-level governance even at the neighborhood level. There is considerable potential and possibility for community-based governance to address the numerous challenges of water production and appropriation. The choices are not solely state-centered or market-centered.
Challenges for Community Institutions
Even assuming that a community has considerable management and exclusion rights and that relationships among community members are not severely asymmetrical, communities still confront multiple problems in governing a shared water system. In resolving each problem, communities must also balance transaction costs. Among the most pressing problems that appropriators of a water system face are exclusion, water allocation and use, and maintenance. Exclusion centers on deciding who will be allocated the rights of access and withdrawal and the basis of those rights. Allocation and use issues involve determining how rights of access and withdrawal may be exercised. Maintenance centers on deciding how maintenance activities will be carried out and allocating the burdens of such activities. Each issue is intertwined and thus how well one issue is addressed will affect how well the other issues will be resolved. The failure to adequately limit access will place considerable stress on allocation and use as too little water is allocated among too many water users. That, in turn, will threaten maintenance as water users may feel that the benefits that they receive from the system are so meager that they are reluctant to contribute to its maintenance.
Problems of access, use, exclusion, and maintenance implicate property rights and how they are exercised. The uncoordinated exercise of property rights may lead to disaster. Too many people taking too much water and not contributing to the upkeep of the system can drive it into ruin. The coordinated exercise of property rights can make all water users better off. Coordination requires rules, and rules, to be effective, require commitment to comply with them. Unconditional commitment can never be realized. On multiple occasions water users will be tempted to break the rules; drought, loss of family labor, increasingly attractive alternative income opportunities are among many reasons that will tempt water users to back out of their commitments. Commitment to the rules may quickly unravel as water users come to realize that rule violations are the norm. Thus, coordination of the exercise of property rights requires rules to guide behavior and commitment to following those rules. Commitment problems are reduced to the extent that it becomes difficult and costly to evade the rules.
In a community in which resource users are on roughly equal footing, the distinction between commitment problems and agency problems becomes blurred. Users are committing to one another that they will follow the agreed upon rules. They are not agents for one another. In a number of instances, however, users may choose to delegate authority to some to carry out duties on behalf of all community members. In numerous farmer-managed irrigation systems, farmers select guards to oversee the water allocation process. In addition, these same farmers often select leaders who are to coordinate labor contributions for the maintenance of the water system. Delegating authority to some to act on behalf of all creates the possibility of agency problems. How do water users ensure that their guards and their leaders act in appropriate ways?
Communities of water users face numerous challenges in governing their water systems. They must limit entry, allocate water, and maintain the water system. They must credibly commit to following the rules that they design to address these challenges and they must maintain control over those to whom they delegate authority on behalf of the community. One of the keys to doing all of these things well is in designing rules well matched to the setting and the various challenges that they face.
Designing Rules
Communities devise rules that guide and constrain members' exercise of their shared property rights in relation to one another. Ideally, the rules should provide appropriate incentives for individuals to exercise their rights in ways that sustain the water system, that is, they should serve as incentive generators. This view of rules underlies game theory. Games are solved by identifying the payoffs (or incentives) that rules and strategies produce.
Part of the value of the growing literature on community-based governance of common pool resources is the identification of the hundreds of types of rules designed by communities that in their particular context generate appropriate incentives for community members to exercise their property rights in ways that individually and collectively make themselves better off (Ostrom 1999 ). For instance, many communities successfully control access to their shared resources against outsiders by adopting rules that establish specific requirements for gaining entry to the shared resource. The most common forms of what Ostrom (1999) calls boundary rules are residency requirements. Additional rules often require membership in a local water users' association, ownership of land in the command area of an irrigation system, payment of fees, and ownership of shares of a local organization or of the resource itself. As Ostrom (1999:513) concludes: "Many of the rich diversity of boundary rules used by appropriators in the field attempt to ensure that the appropriators will relate to others who live nearby and have a longterm interest in sustaining the productivity of the resource."
A rich diversity of rules is also characteristic of community attempts to resolve allocation and use issues. Commonly used water allocation rules include fixed time slots, rotation systems, and a fixed percentage of water available at a given time . Fixed time slots are among the most commonly used rules, whereas fixed percentage of water is less commonly used. Ostrom (1999) notes that fixed time slots provide irrigators considerable certainty concerning when they will receive water, however, the amount of water that will be available is not certain. For fixed time slots to work well some amount of water must be regularly available. Fixed percentage rules allocate water among irrigators when it is available. Such rules provide considerable certainty over a share of water but not necessarily the timing of when and how much water will be available. In many irrigation systems governed by farmers, different sets of allocation rules are used depending on the availability of water Lam 1998) . During seasons of plentiful water, all irrigators may be allowed to take as much water as they want. During seasons of limited water supplies, allocation and use rules may be strictly followed, and in seasons during which water supply is very poor, farmers may have in place rules that shut down certain portions of the command area.
In general, these rules closely tie irrigators together, with the welfare of one highly dependent on the actions of the others. Taking water out of turn, or taking water outside of the rotational system, affects the availability of water for other irrigators. Furthermore, these rules provide incentives to farmers to both follow them and monitor them. Failure to take water at the allotted time can be disastrous to an irrigator, as can allowing another to take water at the irrigator's allotted time.
Rules do more, however, than create incentives to act in particular ways. Another dimension of rules that receives somewhat less attention is their ability to generate information about the behavior of others who are also subject to the rules (Runge 1984) and about the effects of people's actions on a water system. Runge (1984) argues that in many common-pool resource settings, appropriators are conditional cooperators. Individuals are more likely to cooperate with one another and follow agreed upon rules that allow them to coordinate their actions if they believe that others are also following the rules. How do they know if others are following the rules? They know if in following the rules they are also able to easily observe the actions of other individuals. Furthermore, they may be much less likely to violate the rules if they know that their actions are easily observed. Ostrom (1999) observes that a defining feature of rules devised by communities is the ease by which rules may be monitored by all appropriators. Rules of allocation and use commonly rely on some form of taking turns, closely tying together the actions of appropriators. Missing a turn or taking a turn out of order is readily observed. Also, commonly understood water rotation systems allow farmers to readily check on the actions of those who are in charge of moving the water from segment to segment of the command system. 5 Thus, well-designed rules that generate information by easing the costs of observation help reduce commitment and agency problems. This is one reason that it has been easier to establish property rights for surface water (where withdrawals are more easily observable) than for groundwater. Finally, another means by which commitment and agency problems are reduced is by making rule violations, if detected, costly. That is, enforcement and sanctioning also have a key role to play. Since considerable self-monitoring occurs within many community-based arrangements, considerable social pressure is brought to bear on individuals to follow the rules. Appropriators may chide one another and publicly comment on one another's behavior. In many communities, self-monitoring is the only form of rule enforcement. 6 In other communities, appropriators select monitors, or guards, to supplement self-monitoring and enforcement activities. Guards, who are invariably drawn from their own communities, are typically given considerable authority in dealing with minor infractions, and much less authority to deal with major infractions. Guards may impose small fines at the time of the rule infraction that must be paid on the spot. More serious rule infractions often require the rule violator to be brought before some type of group of his peers to be sanctioned. In any case, sanctioning is graduated. Minor offenses are dealt minor punishments and serious offenses are dealt more serious punishments, both with the goal of bringing the violator back into the fold of rule-following appropriators.
Community-devised rules are embedded in dense social networks that support and encourage rule-following behavior. Multiple and personal ties among appropriators encourage rule-following behavior. Violating the trust of a neighbor, friend, or family member is more difficult and costly than violating the trust of a stranger. Community-devised rules, in turn, often support and maintain dense social networks (Ostrom 1999) . For instance, the widespread use of local residency requirements as a condition of accessing a shared resource means that local people who know one another and who have ties to the area are going to be using the resource.
Zanjera Example
The zanjera system used in parts of the Philippines, as described by Coward (1979) , encapsulates the numerous issues covered earlier. To be part of a zanjera system, an individual or family must acquire a share in the irrigators' association. The share entitles the holder to land in the irrigation system, a portion of water, and a right to vote for leaders. In turn, the share obligates the holder to abide by the rules of the association and contribute to the maintenance of the system. Thus, access is strictly limited through the acquisition of shares. Each share is associated with several pieces of land dispersed from the head of the canal to the tail of the canal. Using scattered plots of land dampens the severe conflicts that often emerge among headenders and tail-enders. In addition, farmers face incentives to ensure that water allocation rules are abided by so that water is available to plots located toward the end of the canal. Finally, scattering plots throughout the command area allows farmers to better deal with severe water shortages. During water short periods, entire sections of the command area are shut down to irrigation. Farmers may lose a plot or two of land to such a closure; however, farmers will still have access to land in sections that are still irrigated.
Even though such rules appear to provide adequate incentives for farmers to follow the rules and to generate sufficient information so that farmers can determine whether rules are being followed, farmers select guards from among themselves to implement, monitor, and enforce the rules. Guards are compensated by being allocated additional plots of land located at the tail end of the canal. The compensation scheme provides clear incentives for guards to monitor water allocation rules carefully. But what keeps the guards from exploiting their position and grabbing more water than they are allowed? Who monitors the monitors? The guards are farmers who live and work among those they are monitoring. Farmers can easily monitor one another as well as the guards. Since guards are farmers, they are also embedded in numerous social networks and they are well versed and conditioned by community norms and expectations.
Comparing Community and Central Governance
Community-based governance has the potential to work well for a variety of reasons. First, community members who devise the rules are also subject to them. The rules are likely to carry considerable legitimacy, which enhances commitment to them. Second, community members who devise the rules can draw on critical time and place information to better match the rules to the setting and to the problems that the community confronts. The rules are likely to be designed in ways that provide incentives for people to follow them most of the time, reducing the magnitude of commitment and agency problems. Furthermore, rules are often designed in ways that generate considerable information for community members. In following the rules, water users can easily observe whether others are also following the rules and whether guards are monitoring and enforcing the rules. Finally, social ties and norms can act to reinforce rule-following behavior. It is easier to take advantage of a stranger compared to a neighbor not just because a stranger may have a more difficult time understanding what has occurred, but also because the stranger has little recourse against the person who cheated. Time and place information and social ties and norms are vital mechanisms for addressing resource and relationship problems, mechanisms to which other forms of governance do not have such ready access.
To demonstrate this latter point, imagine a setting in which a provincial or central government rather than the community exercises considerable authority in relation to exclusion and management of a water system. The primary locus of governance and rulemaking is with the higher level of government. Just as with community-based governance, commitment to the rules devised by the central government is problematic. Commitment on the part of the water users to the rules is affected by a variety of factors-perceived legitimacy of the rules, how well the rules match the interests of water users, and how well matched the rules are to the physical and social circumstances.
Each of these factors favors community-based governance over higher level governance of water abstraction (see Table 2 .1). Central government authorities do not have access to the time and place information that would allow a careful matching of the rules to the physical and social circumstances. Also, government authorities will take into account different or multiple interests in devising rules. No longer is it just the interests of water users that will be addressed. For instance, government authorities and water users often part ways on issues of exclusion. Governments often seek to extend the water system to as many users as is possible even if that is likely to exceed the capacity of the system . This, in turn, places considerable pressure on designing allocation and use rules that extend water to the very edges of the water system and on ensuring the reliability of a stable water supply. Time and place information, which government officials do not have ready access to, would support the development of well-matched rules. However, the more finely tuned the allocation and use rules are, the greater the burden of monitoring such diverse rules. Moreover, water users may be unwilling to follow rules that they believe reveal information about themselves that can be used to their disadvantage by authorities. The most well-known instance of this is the reluctance of consumers of public goods to honestly reveal their demand, understating their demand if they believe they will have to pay, and overstating their demand if they believe that it will be made available to them for free (Oakerson 1999) .
Given the numerous information problems that government officials are likely to encounter, often governments adopt a single type of allocation rule and apply it
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EDELLA SCHLAGER Monitoring and Tend to be more informal, rest heavily on social Tend to be formal and independent of enforcement ties and norms communities uniformly. A single type of rule applied to all water users is perceived as fair-all water users are treated alike; and a single type of water rule is easier to design, monitor, and enforce by government officials. The multiple resources that water users can draw on to buttress commitment to rules are much less available to government officials. Government officials cannot readily tap legitimacy, time and place information, social ties, and networks. Thus, commitment problems on the part of water users in government-managed systems are likely to be more acute. Commitment becomes a two-way street in this setting. The issue is not just how committed are the appropriators to following the rules. Just as important is how committed the government is to following, monitoring, and enforcing the rules. The government must implement, monitor, and enforce the rules that it has adopted in a consistent fashion. If government officials repeatedly violate the rules, or refuse to enforce them against certain individuals, commitment among water users is likely to begin to erode. If water users have no means, or very weak means, by which to hold government officials accountable, commitment problems may become that much more severe. Thus, in this situation, it is not just a matter of providing assurances to water users that all water users will follow the rules; it is also a matter of providing assurances that the government will also follow the rules.
As Ostrom (1990) notes, a critical piece to addressing issues of commitment is monitoring and enforcement of the rules. Not only does monitoring and enforcement discourage would-be rule-breakers from following through on their intentions, but effective monitoring and enforcement provides assurances to all water users that rule-following behavior is being encouraged.
Just as with community-based governance, however, appointing guards to monitor and enforce the rules creates agency problems. How does the government ensure that its guards effectively guard? This is a particularly challenging issue. According to , in many government-managed irrigation systems, guards are appointed who are not part of the communities that they are monitoring, nor are they subject to the rules that they are enforcing. Thus, community ties and norms do not act to keep guards in line as they do in community-governed systems. In fact, one of the reasons that outside guards are used in government-owned irrigation systems and are often regularly rotated among water systems is so that communities do not "capture" guards .
Although the problem of community capture appears to be taken care of, the central issue remains-how to ensure that guards guard well. A delicate balance must be struck between providing too powerful incentives to monitor carefully, such as directly tying compensation to the number of rule violators detected, encouraging guards to prey upon water users, and providing inadequate incentives to monitor carefully so that hardly any monitoring occurs at all. Furthermore, in government-managed systems, enforcement tends to be less immediate than in community systems. The problem is compounded further by the remote location of irrigation systems so that it is difficult for superiors to monitor guards or for guards to have easy access to government conflict resolution mechanisms.
Government officials do not have access to time and place information that would assist them in devising finely tuned rules that would provide appropriate incentives and information to water users. In addition, government officials, through the rules that they adopt, often pursue goals not entirely compatible with the interests of communities. Commitment to the rules in such settings is challenging. One of the most critical tools that governments have available to them to support rulefollowing behavior is monitoring and enforcement. However, monitoring and enforcement is itself problematic.
When Are Higher Levels of Government Appropriate?
The above argument should not be interpreted as meaning that higher levels of government have no role in governing water. First, governments can support the efforts of locals to govern water systems through a variety of actions. Governments can commit to allowing water users to engage in local governance by recognizing such rights and by making it difficult for government officials to intervene in local affairs. In addition, governments can provide conflict resolution mechanisms for water users to sort out their differences.
In both California and Colorado, state courts of equity provide forums for water users to resolve their conflicts. In California, water users can adjudicate their water rights by allowing a judge to define and allocate rights or by devising their own water allocation and use arrangements that the judge must then approve. Such adjudications are recognized under state law and are enforceable (Blomquist 1992) . Judges also appoint water masters to monitor the arrangements and to provide that information to water users.
In Colorado, state water courts help water users settle their conflicts. The initial action in a state water court is to have a water referee work with the conflicting parties to resolve their conflicts. If that fails, the water judge oversees the hearing and renders a judgment. The Colorado State Engineer's Office works closely with the water courts, providing technical information to help resolve the conflict. Finally, states can provide technical and financial assistance to local water users to assist them in better understanding, repairing, and maintaining their water systems. The key is in providing local water users with assistance and not taking over, and in resolving issues to the satisfaction of government officials.
Second, communities are ill equipped to handle some water issues, requiring governments to take the lead in addressing them. In particular, communities may not have the capacity or the incentive to address water quality problems. As Rose (2002:239) argues: "in the case of many environmental resources-for example, wide-ranging fish or animals, or widely dispersed or invisible pollution-community members are unlikely to observe the impacts of behaviors even within the community, much less the environmental impacts of others on an intercommunity basis. Hence communities may not generate resource-related norms with respect to the entire resource, but at most with respect to some aspect of its use." Water quality issues are significantly different from water allocation and use issues. Applying Ostrom's (2001) resource and appropriator attributes to the issue of water quality helps to clarify the difference. Ostrom (2001) suggests that resource users are much more likely to devise rules to govern their use of a resource if they have access to reliable, low-cost indicators that readily inform them of the condition of the resource; if resource dynamics are relatively predictable so that users can learn and act in meaningful ways; and if the spatial extent of that aspect of the resource that is the focus of concern is sufficiently limited so that the community has some hope of gaining control over it.
Water quality issues do not stack up well against Ostrom's resource attributes. Reliable, low-cost indicators of water quality are unlikely to be available, resource users are unlikely to detect or readily understand the dynamics of water pollution, and water transports pollutants far from their sources, making it difficult for community-based collective action to make a difference. Pollution sources may not originate within the community, and if they do, communities may find it more desirable to simply allow water sources to transport the pollutants elsewhere. Thus, unlike water allocation and use issues in which water users have many mechanisms that allow them to learn, to observe, and to effectively act, such is not the case with water quality issues. Water users cannot easily observe one another's polluting activities. Polluting activities may even be hidden from the polluter. The consequences of polluting activities may be difficult to detect, and even if detected, community members may believe that there is little that they can do that would effectively deal with the issue. 7 Is it then simply a matter of governments investing in modeling the dynamics of water pollution, and monitoring and detection? Would supplying high-quality information be sufficient to spur community governance efforts to address water quality problems? This would not necessarily be true because of two of Ostrom's (2001) attributes of appropriators-common understanding and salience. Even if a government generates good quality information about pollution levels in water, such information does not readily translate into a common understanding of how water users' actions contribute to water quality problems. Multiple types of pollution introduced in different locations make it challenging to identify the primary causes of pollution and the appropriate actions to take. Also, water quality may not become a salient issue to most water users until the issue is quite severe and the low-cost ways that individuals may use to mitigate the consequences of water pollution are no longer viable. Even then, however, community-based action may not emerge. Individual behavior is difficult to readily and publicly observe, and individual behavior does not immediately and directly affect the welfare of others in any observable fashion.
Although water allocation and use issues, because of the nature of the problem, fit well with the strengths of community-based management, water quality issues do not fit as well (see Table 2 .1). The many mechanisms that communities call upon in governing the use of a water source are likely to come into play around water quality issues only, if at all, in weaker forms. Thus, water quality is likely to be an issue better suited to the capacities of higher-level governments. First, one of the strengths of a larger government is to account for regional issues, support coordination among communities, and balance interests among communities. A higher-level government has the ability to prevent or limit communities from disposing of their pollution problems on one another. Second, although higher-level governments do not have access to good time and place information, they can access the technical resources and expertise necessary to identify, measure, and monitor water quality problems. Third, higher-level governments have the authority to devise rules and regulations, and to provide the resources needed to invest in pollution prevention and mitigation.
Although a higher-level government has at its disposal mechanisms better suited to addressing water quality issues than does a community, in deploying those mechanisms commitment, agency, and decisionmaking problems must be addressed. Decisionmaking costs may be quite high if a government attempts to craft relatively detailed rules covering different sources and types of pollution across diverse circumstances. Decisionmaking costs may be lowered by defining less precise regulations; however, that raises agency costs. Those subject to the rules may act in unintended or unanticipated ways and those monitoring and enforcing the rules may be given too much leeway in carrying out their duties.
Commitment, agency, and decisionmaking costs may be mitigated somewhat by the participation of communities in various aspects of water quality issues. As argued earlier, communities may not be well suited for taking a lead role in addressing water quality issues. Nevertheless, actively involving communities in some aspects of water quality can support the efforts of governments to address such issues. For instance, the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) is actively reaching out to communities to address nonpoint sources of water pollution. The command-and-control approach of developing and implementing strict regulations appeared to work reasonably well to limit the impacts of major single-point sources of pollution, such as waste water treatment plants, and paper and pulp mills, on water quality. However, such an approach does not work well in addressing the activities of hundreds, if not thousands, of individual farmers and homeowners as they apply insecticides, pesticides, and fertilizers to their fields and lawns. Not only are the individual impacts quite small, although collectively they are significant, but the point of use (where the fertilizer was applied) versus the point of impact (where the fertilizer enters a water source) may be quite different. Rather than attempting to regulate each individual pollution source, the EPA is instead working with local communities to develop local governing arrangements better suited to addressing nonpoint sources of pollution. Through its National Estuary Program the EPA works with coastal communities to mitigate the effects of nonpoint sources of pollution on estuaries and through its watershed partnership program it works with inland communities to protect local watersheds (EPA 2004a, b) .
In general, communities have mechanisms available to them that governments do not that allow communities to more readily address the trade-offs in a water allocation and use setting. However, in a water quality setting, governments possess clear advantages over communities for addressing water quality problems while also attending to the trade-offs among commitment, agency, and decisionmaking.
Conclusion
Water allocation and use and water quality problems present different challenges to communities and governments. In many instances communities may be better suited for addressing and resolving water allocation and use issues. Communities of water users can access a variety of mechanisms that allow them to govern such problems while mitigating and developing appropriate trade-offs among commitment, agency, and decisionmaking problems that are inherent in any situation in which multiple actors exercise shared property rights. Governments can strengthen and support communities in their efforts at managing water allocation problems. Such support may act to reduce the transaction costs communities must bear in coordinating the actions of their members, such as when governments provide conflict resolution mechanisms or when governments support community monitoring efforts. Of course, coordinating the actions of governments and communities, that is, ensuring that vertical linkages are mutually supportive, raises additional transaction cost issues. In many instances, governments are better suited for taking the lead in relation to water quality issues. Governments have access to resources and expertise necessary to manage water quality concerns. Involving communities, however, can mitigate the transaction costs that governments face in such undertakings. Community involvement may lead to community commitment and thus ease the burden on government enforcement efforts, for instance.
Attending to commitment, agency, and decisionmaking problems that are likely to arise in a given setting may lead to a reconsideration of who should exercise which rights. For instance, limiting the ability of government officials to use resources for patronage instead of for the operation and expansion of a water system often requires that authority to exercise certain property rights be allocated away from government officials. Engaging in a concession with a private firm allocates management and exclusion rights away from government officials and to private managers. Addressing agency problems that may be encountered by granting greater authority to a private firm to operate and expand a water system may require water users to be allocated limited management and exclusion rights so that they have the authority to ensure that they gain access to water services. Several analysts have noted the need to allow citizens, especially poorer citizens, the authority to explore and possibly provide water services in their neighborhoods, particularly if the concession period means it would be decades before they would receive service.
Appropriately resolving water allocation issues and water quality issues is not simply a matter of assigning the task to the actors best suited to resolving the issue. It is also a matter of attending to the relationships among those who concurrently exercise property rights in a given water allocation or water quality setting. Addressing the interactions that are likely to emerge among actors often provides insight on who should take the lead in resolving a collective problem. Conversely, focusing on the appropriate level of government or appropriate actors to address problems often provides insight and guidance on dealing with structuring appropriate relationships among them.
Getting relationships right among diverse property rights holders is as difficult and technically challenging as it is to build an irrigation system or a water and sanitation system. It is as difficult and technically challenging as developing incentivecompatible market arrangements, which are just a special case of getting relationships right. Focusing on getting relationships right among diverse property rights holders adds considerable, but necessary, complexity to the provision and production of water systems and water quality.
In general, social scientists understand the strengths and the limitations of government-centered approaches to addressing common-pool resources. They are coming to a better understanding of the conditions under which market-based arrangements are likely to work well as well as the limitations and shortcomings of market-based approaches. They have also come to recognize and better understand alternatives to government and market approaches, which has led to a much greater appreciation of the strengths and limitations of local-level, self-governing efforts.
